Abstract -Different jurisdictions disagree on whether a person facing an illegitimate threat is ever required to retreat in the face of it or to submit to it, rather than using force in defence. Those that have attempted to identify the principled position on this issue also disagree about (a) the philosophical source (if any) of the duty to retreat;
Introduction
Different jurisdictions have different rules about whether a person is required to avoid conflict, if possible, instead of using defensive force. Some jurisdictions, primarily in the United States, do not expect retreat in the face of certain attack, either generally, or, from specified places.
1 Others, like
England and Wales, treat efforts to retreat as evidence that the use of defensive force was reasonable.
2 Still others, like Scotland, permit the use of force in defence only if the agent had no reasonable means of escape or retreat. 3 In each of these jurisdictions, the posited law is implicitly or explicitly taken to be justified on the basis of underlying philosophical principle rather mere formal rules of legislative authority and form. However, the proper statement of this underlying principle is also the subject of intense academic dispute. In particular, theorists disagree about (a) the philosophical source (if any) of a person's duty to retreat;
(b) the interests that may privately be defended; and (c) the point of time at which private force becomes available to a defender.
In this paper, I address these disputes while examining the principles underpinning the legitimate private use of force. In Section 2, I examine how the state's monopoly of force shapes a subject's private access to force, and suggest refinements in how we classify and understand the limitations usually imposed on such force. Specifically, I propose that these conditions be classified 1 For instance North Carolina General Statutes, §14-51.2, 14-51.3; Florida Statutes, §776.012, 776.013, 776.031, 776.032; Illinois Criminal Code of 1961, SS.7-1, 7-2, 7-3; Kentucky Revised Statutes, §503.080 . In German law too, the traditional principle is that 'right must never yield to wrong', and therefore a person need never retreat in the face of a wrongful threat. This rule is moderated under special conditions by socio-ethical constraints requiring restraint, and perhaps also a limited retreat, when the aggressor is not culpable, or when the defender has given rise to the need for self-defence through her own unlawful acts. See George P Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Little, Brown and Company1978) at 865, and Mordechai Kremnitzer, 'Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: Another View ' (1983) 18(2) Israel Law Review 178, 207. See also Albin Eser, 'Justification and Excuse ' (1976) in terms of whether they govern in-principle access to private force, or the subsequent deployment thereof. In Section 3, I examine three interests often taken to be privately defensible, viz.
Hohfeldian liberties, the social-legal order, and honour, and argue that they are either not privately defensible, or only sometimes privately defensible. In Section 4, I critique existing theories of retreat in the criminal law, and describe an alternative composite explanation of retreat and submission that flows from the arguments made herein. I argue that the 'duty to retreat' flows from the availability of alternatives to the private use of force, and that in principle, a person may privately use force when faced with a present and unavoidable threat to defensible interests. I further argue that the 'duty to submit' stems from the unavailability of effective defensive responses that are not disproportionately more serious than the threat being repelled.
Although I refer to arguments and examples drawn primarily from English and American law, I will not attempt to justify the doctrinal law of any jurisdiction. Furthermore, in order to keep this paper manageable in scope, I will assume throughout that there is no gap between the agent's perception of situational facts, a reasonable perception of those facts, and the objective facts. An argument on how, if at all, this paper's account of retreat and submission in private defence must be modified to account for any such gap that appears, must await another day.
Private Access to Force and the State's Monopoly of Force
Every modern state assumes the role of the primary enforcer of rights, and exercises 4 a monopoly over the legitimate use of force ('MLF') within its jurisdiction, such that no individual subject to its jurisdiction is ordinarily permitted to use force. 5 It stakes out the boundaries of MLF by declaring 4 To clarify, I need not, and do not take any stand as to the source of the state's MLF here. Even if the state receives its MLF from its citizens, on any plausible account this entrustment cannot (at least in effect) be revocable. Even if such a revocation is theoretically possible (say by way of a revolution), that possibility can be discounted in the ordinary course of political affairs.
that certain uses of force are presumptively criminal, inasmuch as criminal liability will follow from them unless some defence is offered. Some uses of force fall outside the boundaries of MLF -for instance consensual force is not presumptively criminal, because in principle, valid consent negates the actus reus of an offence. 6 Similarly, the state's MLF also excludes most instances of purely private force against one's own entitlements or property, and arguably, the limited use of force permitted in parental chastisement. I will not dwell on instances of force that are considered external to MLF here. Instead, I focus on instances of private force that lie within the ordinary bounds of MLF, but are nevertheless permitted by the state as exceptions to MLF. Examples include instances of force used in:
(a) the justified private defence of person or property; 7 (b) the prevention of crime; and (c) making a citizen's arrest.
The 'duty to retreat' is generally envisioned as something to be performed by a person facing a threat (D) before she is permitted to use force in justified private defence. In other words, retreat is understood as a precondition for access to exception (a) to MLF. Therefore, we must start with a closer examination of MLF. Philosophy & Public Affairs 3, who seems to include PARSIMONIOUSNESS (at 5) as well as some elements of NON-DISPROPORTIONALITY (at 5-6) in his understanding of necessity. These theorists do not object to the use of defensive force that is disproportionately less than the threat faced -their objection is to excessive defensive force. I think the term 'NON-DISPROPORTIONALITY' better conveys that idea. The different terminologies used refer to exactly the same overall set of ideas. However, I believe that the manner in which the ideas have been apportioned between 'necessity' and 'proportionality' in extant academic discourse is potentially misleading, because it obscures some conceptual connections between the applicable principles.
REQUIREMENT then encapsulates the necessary and sufficient conditions for the private actor's in-principle access to legitimate force, whereas the Derivative Force consideration limits the amount of force that may be ceded to a private actor with in-principle access to it, and the manner in which it may be deployed. Any (non-posited) rule that limits a private individual's access to legitimate force or her subsequent deployment of it, slots into one of these two categories, and between them, these two categories exhaust all the principled preconditions 13 for the permissible private use of force.
As I mentioned previously, each state may adopt its own unique stipulation of MLF. Although this technical observation is important to the argument that follows, I will continue to use the term 'duty to retreat' here, because it is a familiar way to refer to the guidance favouring retreat.
The Substantive Interests in Play
In the previous section, I stated that an individual may only use force to defend against threats to 'entitlements'. Therefore, before attempting to identify the rules governing permissible private defence, we need some sense of which entitlements may, in principle, be privately defended. It is undisputed that the standard set of personal and property claim-rights is privately defensible.
However some theorists also treat additional claims as being amenable to private defence. Betty, but this wrong may well be a victimless wrong. The state often makes rules that perform coordination functions, and persons violating these rules may diffusely affect the overall system without wronging any particular individual. Such violators commit wrongs without violating any individuals' claim-rights. A jaywalker on a deserted street commits such a wrong. She commits the same wrong even when some individual -say a driver who has to slow down because of her jaywalking -feels particularly aggrieved. It is strange to say that the aggrieved driver had a claimright not to have had to slow down. Equally, it is strange to say that Betty has a claim-right to remain in her spot. A wrong does not always imply the existence of an individual with a claim-right.
The various other intuitions that Quong explains on the basis of his theoretical claim-right to the space one occupies 18 can similarly be explained either by reference to more established claim-rights (such as rights relating to property or the body), or wrongs relatable to co-ordination rules.
Therefore, insofar as Quong took on the burden of establishing, by a process of elimination, the existence of a general claim-right to the space one occupies, he fails -he is unable to eliminate these alternative explanations for the intuitions he defends. Indeed, these alternative explanations are far more plausible, since they accord with more established theoretical conceptions of a Hohfeldian liberty.
B. The Social-Legal Order
One might now argue that the entire set of legal rules, including co-ordination rules, cumulatively set up a social-legal order, which contributes to a general sense of security and predictability.
Individuals rely on the continuance of this social-legal order when making ordinary decisions like when to cross the street, or where to park. Although the state is entrusted with maintaining this social-legal order, it does so for the benefit of its subjects, who retain a beneficial interest in its maintenance. When T culpably threatens to commit a wrong, she also threatens the social-legal order, thereby threatening the subjects' private interest in the maintenance of the social-legal order.
Surely this private interest in the maintenance of the social-legal order is amenable to private defence, using force if required? 19 Or in more practical terms, when T tries to jaywalk, surely it should be a reason in favour of D using force to stop T that we do not want inconsiderate jaywalkers to get their way, by superseding the social-legal order we are guaranteed?
This is an interesting proposition, and there is some truth in it. But if a person acting in legitimate private defence of the social-legal order is justified and not excused, then she must act non-criminally and within the scope of her authority. That view is difficult to reconcile with the widespread consensus that the maintenance of the social-legal order is, at least in the first instance, not the individual's, but the state's responsibility. 20 Private individuals do not have any general ex ante authority to maintain the social-legal order. In fact, modern states characterise private persons who take it upon themselves to do so as vigilantes, not upstanding citizens. 21 True, many states accept that when the state is unavailable, an individual may take steps to maintain the social-legal order, and accordingly, they grant citizens some powers to make arrests, and offer a defence of prevention of crime. However, these states invariably restrict these concessions such that they are only available in response to culpable threats to core or foundational elements of the social-legal order. For instance, S.3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 allows an individual to use reasonable force to effect or assist an arrest, or to prevent crime, but S.24A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, limits the exercise of this power of arrest to indictable offences. Hence, at least in the context of citizens' arrests, the state recognises a private interest in maintaining the social-legal order only when more serious (and therefore indictable) crimes are in issue. The 'indictable crimes' restriction may be seen as a device to identify crimes that threaten core elements of the social-legal order.
Although no similar statutory restrictions explicitly limit the use of force in preventing crime, this power flows from the same underlying interest in maintaining the social-legal order as the power to make a citizen's arrest. Therefore, it would be entirely appropriate for the English courts to adopt a similarly narrow view of the kinds of threats to the social-legal order that generate the in-principle entitlement to use force to prevent crime, and given their conservative attitude towards the prevention of crime defence, 22 this seems very probable indeed. Illustratively, it seems unlikely that the courts will hold that the interest in maintaining the social-legal order justifies the use of any private force whatsoever to prevent minor and non-victimising offences like speeding down an "The right of the citizen to use force on his own initiative is... more circumscribed when he is not defending his own person or property but simply wishes to see the law enforced in the interests of the community at large. The law will not tolerate vigilantes. If the citizen cannot get the courts to order the law enforcement authorities to act…. then he must use democratic methods to persuade the government or legislature to intervene. empty road, or crossing a red light at a deserted intersection, or parking offences. The liveliness of the debate on stand your ground laws suggests that the existence of this supposed general, non-posited entitlement to not appear cowardly is not universally self-evident, and apart from rhetorical invocations of one's ego, no argument for any such entitlement emerges from 'stand your ground' jurisdictions. Thankfully, not everyone has that sort of ego to massage.
Even if an entitlement to 'honour' did exist, it is difficult to believe that one could use force, especially lethal force, to defend it.
However, Statman offers an argument for precisely that -a general non-posited entitlement to honour that may be defended using lethal force -on the basis of his 'success condition'. Statman argues convincingly that PARSIMONIOUSNESS implies that defensive force can only be used if it has some prospect of success. Translated into the terms used in this paper, Statman's argument is that D may not use defensive force if she cannot thereby avert the threat, because in those circumstances the defensive force would be a futile additional breach of MLF. But then we need to explain our intuitive belief that when D's life is unjustly threatened by several attackers, she is entitled to use lethal defensive force against as many of the attackers as possible, even if she is so outnumbered that she has no realistic prospect of thereby saving her life. 26 To this end, Statman tentatively suggests that the proposition that force -even lethal force -can be used to defend one's honour, is the most plausible (though not flawless) explanation for our intuitive belief.
One response to Statman is that for someone with the Hobbesian objection to the stipulation of MLF adopted herein, Statman's scenario poses no difficulty -D may use defensive force in these circumstances because her life is under threat, and her right to defend her life and bodily integrity, being an inalienable natural right, is not derived from the state. Being outside the ambit of MLF, it is not limited by the success condition. To include those with the Hobbesian objection in the discussion of Statman's argument, I will recast Statman's puzzle in terms not involving threats to life and bodily integrity. This has the added advantage of making it plausible to think of the person using defensive force in a lost cause being made to stand trial for her actions.
Imagine that T has appropriated D's laptop and is about to escape in his (T's) car by driving through a gated exit. D is at the gate, but knows that T's car is travelling so fast that even if D shuts the gate, it will burst through and escape, although its headlights and bumper will be damaged in the process. Is D permitted to shut the gate? Statman says that we would intuitively think so. I accept that most people would think it unlikely that D would be punished for shutting the gate. However, for many people, this intuition is attributable, at least in part, to how unlikely it is that T (or an observer) would complain to the police about the damage to T's car on these facts. Others might reach the same conclusion because they believe that even if D was tried for damaging T's car, she would be excused from punishment. But when we excuse D, we do not accept that she acted permissibly, and therefore we do not support the conclusion that Statman draws. Of course, some might still believe that D is actually permitted to slam the gate shut, but I doubt that the intuitive support for that proposition is anywhere near as pervasive as Statman seems to think it is. Because I deny that the state authorises the private use of force for extracting vengeance, I see no reason why it should authorise D to slam the gate shut on these facts (although it might still excuse D for having done so). On this view, Statman's puzzle disappears, and there is no need to posit a contrived solution depending on the existence of a general entitlement to honour.
All in all, the normative case for treating honour as being amenable to private forceful defence remains unconvincing. Ashworth's contention that the use of defensive force against a threat that can be averted by retreat is illegitimate, even if retreat involves some loss of face, 27 remains the more plausible position.
Approaches to Theorising Retreat and Submission
Having examined the sorts of entitlements that are privately defensible, we can now begin to consider the rules governing permissible private defensive force. The principle traditionally identified as the basis for the 'duty to retreat' is necessity. 28 The term 'necessity' has been used in academic discourse to refer collectively to the constraints on the legitimate access to force that I call 27 Ashworth (n12) at 290, 303. interests like "the defence of the social-legal order, the freedom of action of the attacked person, and his honour" as weighing in favour of D's claim to use defensive force. Let us refer to these less central interests collectively as β. The interests clubbed together as β are such that by definition they cannot be protected by retreat. Effectively, Sangero asserts that D is also entitled to β, and that β is also being threatened by T. He then considers whether there is any proportionate defensive response available to D to protect β, failing which, D is directed to retreat. However, if measures not disproportionate to the threat to β can be used to avert the threat to β, then D can stand her ground and employ those measures, despite the possibility of retreat from the threat to α. This is all very well, but it is misleading to describe this analysis as an analysis of the duty to retreat from a threat to α, and it is misleading to describe the guidance to D last recounted as guidance that it is unnecessary to retreat from a threat to α. By taking α out of the proportionality calculus, Sangero all but concedes that there is a 'duty to retreat' from a threat to α because its defence does not require the use of force, while arguing that nevertheless, since β cannot be protected by retreat, force is required to protect β. He then considers what force would be proportionate (or, in the terminology used here, NON-DISPROPORTIONATE) for defending β. Ultimately therefore, even for Sangero, the 'duty to retreat' depends on whether the use of force is required to protect either α or β, and since β is defined such that it cannot be protected by retreat, force is always required to protect it. It only remains to determine how much defensive force would be NON-DISPROPORTIONATE while defending β. Where there is no NON-DISPROPORTIONATE defensive response to a threat to β,
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Sangero's advice to D is more accurately described as "submit 36 to the loss of β (and invoke state mechanisms for later redress)", than "retreat from the threat to α". When a NONthe social legal order in the proportionality calculus is itself questionable. 35 Sangero does contemplate such situations. See case 3 in his Table 2 (B) in Sangero (n12) at 208-9, and also his discussion of what is, essentially, the 'duty to submit' (at 215-7). 36 It is important to remember that like the 'duty to retreat', the guidance in favour of submitting does not impose a Hohfeldian duty. It merely reminds that when even the most PARSIMONIOUS effective defensive force is disproportionate to the threat to β, no force can justifiedly be used.
DISPROPORTIONATE defensive response to a threat to β is available, Sangero's advice to D is more accurately stated as "you may stand your ground and defend yourself against the threat to β", than "you may stand your ground and defend yourself against the threat to α (or, α and β)". Sangero's model of pure retreat (excluding submission) then converges with Ashworth's necessity-based description of retreat. 37 Ashworth recognises that only part of what he calls the necessity condition -the part that I call REQUIREMENT -is sufficient to explain the 'duty to retreat', but does not analyse that part separately. In this paper, I examine the constraints on private force set by REQUIREMENT separately from those set by PARSIMONIOUSNESS, and group PARSIMONIOUSNESS with NON-DISPROPORTIONALITY to consider the constraints that they impose.
A. REQUIREMENT and the 'Duty to Retreat'
We start with REQUIREMENT. Although Sangero's analysis is flawed, it is useful. His errors demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between the preconditions for in-principle access to force, and the constraints upon the manner in which force can be deployed after obtaining inprinciple access to it. Conditions comprising the Derivative Force consideration are, in principle, also applicable to the state in its use of force; not so conditions comprising REQUIREMENT. This is why it is plausible to argue that neither the state, nor an individual, is permitted to use disproportionate or excessive force to quell a threat. By contrast, when faced with a threat to a subject's entitlement, the state is not required to retreat, 38 although the subject concerned might be.
Since the 'duty to retreat' does not (even in principle) apply equally to the state and the individual, it must flow from REQUIREMENT, and not from the Derivative Force consideration. Unreflectively, Sangero applies this very idea in excluding the weight of entitlements that can be protected by 37 Ashworth (n12) at 284-5. 38 At least, not for reasons to do with MLF. It is nevertheless possible that retreat may be required in special cases for reasons of state policy.
retreat from his proportionality analysis. My own conception of the rule on retreat, which flows straightforwardly from the same idea, is this: an entitlement that can be protected by seeking state protection or by retreat contributes no weight to a claim to stand one's ground. Along similar lines, a threat to a core element of the social-legal order that can be averted or reduced to a threat to a noncore element of the social-legal order without the private use of force, also contributes no weight to a claim to stand one's ground. Jurisdictions requiring retreat interpret REQUIREMENT such that it is not satisfied when the threat may be neutralised through state intervention, or by non-forceful means, such as retreat.
But on this model, exactly when is REQUIREMENT satisfied? Is it when the materialisation of the threat is immediate, or when it is unavoidable? To explain the sense in which I employ these terms, let me use a non-legal analogy. When games between excellent chess players end decisively, they often end with one player resigning rather than being checkmated. In situations like these, the defeated player (let's call her Karpova) resigns because she sees an unavoidable checkmate several moves down the line. She may realise for instance, that her opponent has commenced an attack in which (if her opponent plays wisely) she will checkmate Karpova in five moves. Karpova believes that her opponent is good enough to see this sequence of moves, and so decides that since the checkmate is unavoidable, she might as well resign. Alternatively Karpova may play on in the hope that her opponent will blunder. In that case, it is only when her opponent reaches out to move the piece that delivers the coup de grâce that checkmate is immediate. If resigning in chess is seen as an (admittedly strained) metaphor for getting in-principle access to defensive force, then should the state allow Karpova to resign as soon as she sees an unavoidable checkmate, or should it insist that she wait until checkmate is immediate?
Sangero argues for a scalar version of immediacy, in which the more immediate the materialisation of the threat becomes, the more defensive force is available. This is because he collapses the preconditions for access to force and its deployment into a single proportionality analysis, in which the interests of both the defender and the attacker carry weight. required when there is no (non-forceful) way to completely nullify the threat, inasmuch as state protection is unavailable, and retreat is either impossible, or will not nullify, but only postpone the materialisation of the threat. 45 In other words, force is required when a threat is present, and without force, its materialisation would be unavoidable. Thus unavoidability satisfies the REQUIREMENT threshold, and there is no need to wait for the materialisation of the threat to also become immediate before D is allowed in-principle access to force. This is the position I adopt on the exact specification of the REQUIREMENT threshold for my model of the 'duty to retreat'.
Note that this standard imports two distinct prerequisites for crossing the REQUIREMENT threshold: first, the threat must be a present one; and second, its materialisation must be unavoidable (though not necessarily immediate). The former prerequisite has been largely neglected in academic discourse, which has instead focussed on whether defensive force may be used when it
gives D the best chance of averting an anticipated harm, 46 or only when T has unambiguously begun to perform the action that will harm D. 47 These two positions do not exhaust the possibilities. I will argue that it is possible (i) for a threat to present before T begins to perform the action that will actually harm D; and (ii) for D's best chance of averting the anticipated harm to arise before there is a present threat of harm. 48 In terms of the present threat prerequisite of the unavoidability standard, 45 To clarify, when I talk about the materialisation of a threat, I refer not only to situations in which harm is actually caused, but also to situations in which T succeeds in exposing D to an illegitimate risk of harm. Hence when T aims a gun with one bullet in it at D and pulls the trigger with neither party knowing whether the bullet is chambered, the threat to D has materialised whether or not the bullet was in fact chambered. The adoption of the unavoidability standard then requires us to distinguish between an impending threat on the one hand, and a present threat, the materialisation of which is unavoidable
but not yet immediate, on the other. Because the baseline situation is disturbed only when D faces a present threat, she has grounds to seek access to force only in response to a present threat, and not in response to an impending, but not present, threat. To some extent, the practical determination of when this threshold has been crossed will be a matter of judgment, with marginal cases being difficult to classify. Conceptually however, a bright line separates a present threat from a future threat, and important consequences relating to the availability of defensive force turn on this distinction. Although I do not propose to suggest tests for making this distinction here -that would probably require another paper 50 -I am confident that the 'in-principle' distinction can be made, just chance to save herself from T's violence and impending deadly assault, because she would have been powerless to defend herself against T when T was actually attacking her. Assuming that to be correct, D's best chance of averting the anticipated harm would arise before there was any present threat of harm. See in this connection Kaufman (n7) at 346-8. 49 Ferzan (n42) at 257-62, presents an argument along these lines, using different terminology. She argues that the imminence/immediacy condition has conceptual purchase independently of its usefulness as evidence of the necessity of defensive force -it restricts the legitimate use of force to responses to aggressions. In effect, she changes the imminence/immediacy condition to an aggression condition. See in this connection Baron (n7) at 254-5. I do not adopt This view of the 'duty to retreat' as flowing from REQUIREMENT suggests that the distinction often made between the rule on retreat as applicable to cases calling for lethal defensive force, and other cases, 52 has no philosophical basis. Philosophically, the 'duty to retreat' depends solely on whether there is any way to avert the threat without using any private force at all. Only if that is impossible (and therefore retreat is not required) do we consider the severity of the most PARSIMONIOUS effective defensive response to the threat. Hence, when deciding whether retreat is required, it makes no difference whether the most PARSIMONIOUS effective defensive response to the threat involves lethal or non-lethal force. Once it is established that retreat is not required, the determination of the amount of force permitted is (in philosophical principle) simply a question of proportionality, and the same general rules apply in all cases. Obviously, these rules would require a much higher threshold of proportionality to be met in order to justify the use of lethal force. Therefore, any distinction between the rule on retreat applicable to cases calling for lethal defensive force and other cases, is best explained on doctrinal, rather than philosophical, bases.
Note that this analysis focuses entirely on the rights of D, and not at all on the rights of T. This is entirely appropriate. At the REQUIREMENT threshold, there is no reason to insist that D be concerned with the rights of anyone else, since crossing that threshold creates only in-principle access to force. D only affects the rights of others when she actually deploys that force, and only at that stage should she have to consider the rights of T. At that stage, because D's access to force is derived from the state, it is subject to the limitations that apply to the state. Those limitations are encapsulated in the Derivative Force consideration.
B. Derivative Force and the 'Duty to submit'
Passing the REQUIREMENT threshold does not authorise D to use as much force as she wants to defend her entitlements. Since the individual's authority to use force derives from the state, at most she may use as much force as the state could have used. This Derivative Force consideration includes constraints such as PARSIMONIOUSNESS and NON-DISPROPORTIONALITY. Of these, PARSIMONIOUSNESS is relatively straightforward and uncontroversial. Only defensive options that use the minimal force necessary for repelling the attack are even potentially permissible. 54 Hardly anyone argues that a person may, in self-defence, use more force than would be adequate to repel the attack, even if such force would nevertheless not be disproportionate to the threat posed by the attack.
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A more contested constraint is NON-DISPROPORTIONALITY. I will not attempt to suggest any formula for the actual disproportionality calculus here -despite attempts to do so by others, I doubt that this calculus is reducible to formulaic guidance. Nor will I debate the epistemic variables that must be factored into the proportionality calculus. Instead, assuming epistemic perfection, I use a series of hypotheticals to build on the arguments made in Section 3 and describe what I believe are the minimal contours of a 'duty to submit'. This 'duty to submit' may be made more onerous by a state which legislates to further limit the amount force it delegates to an individual, but it cannot be relaxed without becoming inconsistent with MLF. In each of the scenarios that follow, I assume that state protection is unavailable, and that all parties are fully aware of all relevant facts.
In Case 1, D has parked in T's favourite, but not proprietary or officially designated, parking space. She is still in the driver's seat with the engine on, when T threatens to throw a stone at the car unless D moves. D can avoid the stone in one of only two ways: she can drive out of the way of the stone (thereby vacating the parking space); or she can put a bullet through T's throwing hand before T releases the stone. On the model proposed, since D can avert T's threat without resorting to force by driving out of the parking space (i.e. retreating), the REQUIREMENT threshold for the use of force to protect D's car is not crossed. Assuming that there are no other entitlements in play, D is not authorised to use any force against T whatsoever. Her best option would be to retreat, and let T's comeuppance take the form of state sanction for her attempt or threat to damage D's car. 55 Since we are identifying the ideal parameters of the proportionality calculus, let us assume that the actor perceives the 'true' facts. The only writer who suggests that the deliberate use of non-PARSIMONIOUS force is justifiable is generates conclusions that would strike many as implausible. That said, I cannot offer a knock-down argument about why his thoroughgoing commitment to consequentialism is inappropriate, and so I will not try to convince people who share Alexander's starting point, and his intuitions.
An obvious question arises: Doesn't guiding D to move her car make a mockery of D's freedom to park in that space? I think it does not, partly because D's freedom to park in the space is a mere Hohfeldian liberty which cannot be privately defended, and partly because the guidance offered is not imperative guidance. 56 Despite the 'duty to retreat', D retains her Hohfeldian liberty to stand her ground. Doing so would not expose her to criminal liability. She would not however be permitted to shoot at T's hand to defend her car against the threat posed by T, and she might face criminal liability if she did so. Yet, if T did damage D's car, T could be held criminally responsible for that.
Notice that the 'guidance' offered in Case 1 to D is not that she should avoid parking in the space; it is that she should avoid the stone by vacating the space. The former guidance would have been imperative guidance telling her not to so something that she was normatively unrestrained from doing. Of course the state has the power to give such guidance, but if it did so because of T's illegitimate threat, it would effectively be legitimising T's threat. That would be inappropriate. 57 On the other hand, telling D that her only justified defensive response to T's threat is to move her car out of the parking space is perfectly legitimate, even though D is under no normative restraint against remaining in the space, and even though in a perfect world doing so would not require her to choose between suffering damage to her car or prosecution for shooting T. When D chooses to take any defensive measure, she abandons several alternative courses of action on which she could have embarked without legal censure. Most of the unrestricted courses of action available to us are mutually exclusive, and the mere fact that the law does not intervene to neutralise a factor that makes choosing one of them less attractive does not make the law's 'guidance' illegitimate. Now consider Case 2. Here, T warns D that she will damage D's car if she parks in a 56 Sangero (n12) at 195, noticed the latter factor, but failed to appreciate its significance.
57 But see Alexander (n51) at 1479-80 who differs. In my opinion, a theory that recognises that retreat is a condition for private access to force rather than an imperative duty will accept that until a threat is present, D cannot seek private access to force, and so cannot be put to the condition of retreat for access to it.
specified space. In Variation 1, this space is simply an empty patch of unclaimed land. In Hohfeldian right to park in the space, but no right to restrain each other from parking there should the other meet the conditions. When the state posits a special provision for an individual or section of the public, it can be understood to implicitly also empower the beneficiaries of this provision to protect it within the constraints of the law -it would be redundant to authoritatively reiterate the lack of authoritative guidance against doing something. T's warning then constitutes a threat to D's conditional entitlement to park in the space, and if there is no way to avert this threat (say by convincing T to withdraw the threat) or to avail of state protection, the use of force may be required to protect D's entitlement to park there. Of course, D would still have to ensure that the force she uses satisfies both the PARSIMONIOUSNESS and NON-DISPROPORTIONALITY constraints. In this case, the interests threatened would be D's claim to park in the specified space (and not her Hohfeldian right to her car). This remains the case even if D actually parks in the space (assuming of course that D could still protect her car by moving it). 58 One might argue that T's warning, given that it is culpable, constitutes a threat to D's interests in the maintenance of the social-legal order, and so this should also carry some weight in determining the maximum amount of defensive force that would not be disproportionate. However, it seems unlikely that any state would treat a threat to a person's in-principle access to a parking space as the sort of threat to her interest in the sociallegal order that she can repel using force. In other words, it is unlikely that a state would see T's threatened conduct as a threat to a core element of the social-legal order.
Ashworth argues that where there is some time between D becoming aware of a future threat and the threat actually presenting itself, D ought to seek police protection or inform the police of the impending threat, failing which her use of defensive force would be tainted. This, Ashworth argues, would reduce the need for the private use of force. 59 Undoubtedly, it would. However, this condition does not flow from any of the constraints on the private use of force, because none of them become applicable until an individual actually needs private access to force, i.e. until the threat actually presents itself. They are not imposed as part of a system of measures calculated to minimise the need for private recourse to force. Such a system already exists -it is the legal system in general.
Nothing in MLF ipso facto requires an individual to take steps to pre-empt threats from presenting themselves -whether they be avoiding 'dangerous' places, or not wearing 'provocative clothes', or 58 Such a variation would be Case 1, except that the parking space would be a designated space in a public lot. D would then be entitled to remain in place and use force not disproportionate to the threat to her entitlement to park there (not the threat to her car), to defend that entitlement. So while D might be permitted to tickle T (if that would avert the threat), she would probably not be permitted to punch T. If D has no effective NON-DISPROPORTIONATE response available, her most favourable legal option is to protect her car by vacating the space.
59 Ashworth (n12) at 295-6. C.f. Alexander (n51) at 1479-80, who recommends retreat in such cases.
informing the police of anticipated threats. Of course, it might still be wise and useful for people to inform the police about anticipated threats, and it is perfectly competent for the state to enact the rule that Ashworth suggests. However, this rule is not a part of the general 'duty to retreat', and in the absence of any expressly posited rule to that effect, the failure to take such pre-emptive action should not defeat a person's subsequent claim to justification in using defensive force.
Now consider a different example. In Case 3, D is standing ten feet from the edge of a cliff.
T picks up a stone to throw at D. If the stone hits D, it will inflict minor injury. D can avoid being hit in one of two ways: she can sidestep the stone by moving one foot closer to the edge; or she can pre-emptively throw a stone at T's hand, thereby injuring T and preventing her from throwing the stone. To avoid cluttering up the argument with too many variables, let us assume that neither T's threat to D's entitlement to remain in place, nor her entitlement to avoid being hurt, constitutes a threat to a core element of the social-legal order. 60 In Variation 1, T has only one stone. In preaching. She refused, and was arrested for, and convicted of, wilfully obstructing the police officer in the execution of his duty. Her conviction was set aside on the grounds that the policeman had no right to call upon the appellant to desist from lawful conduct, unless it gave rise to a reasonable apprehension that it would provoke violence by interfering with the rights and liberties of others. was warned that some persons were coming to attack him, stood his ground instead of fleeing. During the ensuing attack, the appellant used lethal force to defend himself against one of his attackers. The Court of Appeal set aside his conviction, holding that the fact that he had stood his ground did not disentitle him from using force to defend himself.
by the siren of a passing ambulance -to cause the attack to cease without the need for force. This no such stipulation exists, the only source of any guidance to retreat comes from REQUIREMENT, which is satisfied by unavoidable, rather than immediate, threats. If D believes that T will keep throwing stones until T hits D, then D is faced with a present and unavoidable threat, and not a contingent threat. Sidestepping the first stone will not avert the threat -it will merely postpone it without affecting its unavoidability. Since it is impossible to avert the threat by means other than injuring T's hand, the REQUIREMENT threshold for the D's use of force is crossed. D is not required to retreat or delay her response, and may legitimately defend herself using force that satisfies the PARSIMONIOUSNESS and NON-DISPROPORTIONALITY constraints.
In examining whether D's most PARSIMONIOUS defensive option is a NON-DISPROPORTIONATE response, it is important to correctly quantify the variables in play. Here, D is faced with the choice of either submitting to injury by stoning, or dying by falling off a cliff. D can reduce the magnitude of the threat she faces by choosing to avoid the more serious threat -the threat to her life. In effect, she can 'retreat' from the threat to her life, albeit by choosing a course of action that involves facing the lesser threat of injury by stoning. Hence the only inevitable and unavoidable threat that D faces from T is the threat of injury by stoning. Her response must be proportionate to that threat. One might still argue that the amount of defensive force that would be appropriate should depend on whether D thinks that T will try to hit D as many times as possible, or just once. If D believes the former, then she can respond with more force than if she believes the latter. I disagree. This proposition clandestinely reintroduces the assumption that D is entitled to stand her ground, when (on the facts stated) all D has is an unrestricted freedom to stand her ground. Since there is no legal entitlement, D is not entitled to stand her ground (although she would incur no blame if she just stood her ground). If D retreats until it is no longer safe to retreat, she will be hit by one stone. 64 Therefore, if D chooses to stand her ground despite having an avenue of safe retreat, the escalation in the scale of the threat she faces is attributable to D's own choice.
65
The unavoidable threat that D faces is only the threat of injury by being struck by one stone, and her response must not in any case be disproportionate to that unavoidable threat. In summary, in Case 3
Variation 2 Situation 1, D can use defensive force immediately, without having to sidestep any stones, or to wait until she at the edge of the cliff. However, the defensive force that she takes must be PARSIMONIOUS and must not be disproportionate to the amount of unavoidable threat she faces -the threat of being hit by one stone. If there is no NON-DISPROPORTIONATE yet effective response available to D, then she cannot legitimately take any defensive action. Her best (legitimate) course of action would be to sidestep the stones for as long as it is safe to do so, and then to suffer minor injury by stoning. She would have to rely on the criminal law to subsequently 64 I assume here that D can retreat to the edge of the cliff without a heightened perception of the risk to herself.
65 Though again, if T hits D multiple times, T remains criminally responsible to the state for the harm actually caused to D by the multiple strikes. Nevertheless, in the model I propose, the extent of D's criminal responsibility is not relevant for determining the amount of defensive force that would be permissible.
punish T, and perhaps claim compensation from T under civil law. D could also legitimately stand her ground and risk greater injury. If as a result T injured D more severely, T would face greater consequences under both criminal and civil law.
66
We can now consider a case that is usually treated as meriting special normative treatmentcalling for either an exception to the rule on retreat, or allowing for a greater amount of legitimate defensive force, viz. an attack by T on D in D's home (or similar place of refuge). 67 I think that the intuitive plausibility of such special treatment derives from the fact that D has a posited entitlement to remain in her dwelling, as opposed to her mere Hohfeldian liberty to remain in a public place.
Furthermore, this entitlement is generally thought to be particularly strong 68 -stronger than, say, the entitlement to park in a public car-park. A threat to D's person that can be averted only by retreat from her home therefore also constitutes an independent threat to her entitlement to remain in her home. If state protection against this second threat is unavailable, and it cannot be averted without force, the REQUIREMENT threshold is crossed, and force may, in principle, be used to neutralise it. Although D may still only use force that satisfies the Derivative Force consideration, because the entitlement to remain in one's home is particularly strong, a NON-DISPROPORTIONATE response to a threat to it might involve much more force than a similarly qualified response to a threat to one's entitlement to park in a public car-park. Therefore although the same rules apply to cases in 66 In reality, the proportionality calculus is (and must inevitably be) much more rough and ready than this, in order to take into account the psychological stresses faced by D in an emergency situation. The hypothetical example described in the main text should therefore be understood as an exercise in philosophical norm clarification, rather than as a practical demonstration of how the courts should determine the proportionality of D's defensive response. which a person may only escape an attack by retreating from her dwelling place, the special nature of the posited entitlement to remain in one's home explains why retreat from the home is considered a special case.
A final clarification is called for at this stage. The foregoing discussion on the 'duty to retreat' and the 'duty to submit' has focussed solely on the ex ante guidance that D can be given as to what conduct is permissible and justified. But even if she does not follow the guidance discussed herein, D may be excused from criminal liability. I do not consider excuses here, but it remains possible that someone who does not prefer effective retreat to using defensive force, or who uses disproportionate or non-PARSIMONIOUS defensive force instead of submitting to a threat, may be excused from criminal liability.
Conclusion
An understanding of the proper scope of the 'duties' to retreat and submit is essential in a world in which individual rights are being asserted with increasing combativeness. While there is every reason for the law to come to the aid of a person facing an undeserved threat to her rights, that policy consideration cannot require the state to dilute its monopoly of force to the extent that the state becomes a secondary agent for the ex ante protection (as distinguished from the ex post enforcement) of rights. A state that does so shirks its responsibility to its citizens, even if it does so in response to popular demand. In requiring its subject to retreat from, and occasionally submit to, a threat, the state reinforces its role as the primary protector of the rights of its subjects.
In terms of the theoretical arguments made in this paper, a person should only be permitted to privately use force to protect (a) interests from the set of privately defensible interests, as qualified in Section 3 above, (b) after a present threat to them arises, and (c) when the threat cannot completely be avoided by retreat.
